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PEKKA KOSONEN 
THE FINNISH MODEL AND THE WELFARE 
STATE  IN CRISIS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The notion of the welfare state came relatively late into the Finnish discussion and polities, albeit the 
ideas of equality and Social security have flourished for decades in Finnish Society. From the 1960s to 
the 1980s, however, welfare systems were institutionalized in Finland, to a great extent along Nordic 
lines. In the 1990s, this development has come to an end, and all proposals point to cuts and reductions 
in social transfers and public services. 
 
How are these sudden changes to he explained? I will try here to answer this question, in particular by 
relating welfare state development to the general characteristics of the Finnish model of economic 
policy.1 First, the Finnish model is compared with other Nordic models, and the expansion and peculi-
arities of the Finnish welfare state are outlined. Then, I ask to which extent the current economic and 
social crisis is due to the welfare state expansion. Moreover, have the preconditions of the Nordic 
models fundamentally changed? Finally, given that the Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish welfare states 
are in serious troubles, I ask how they are prepared to meet the challenge of European integration in the 
1990s. 
 
2. THE FINNISH MODEL, AS RELATED TO THE NORDIC MODEL 
Recently, various types of welfare models or welfare regimes have been distinguished. The typologies of 
Korpi, Esping-Andersen, Leibfried etc. have been discussed and critisized, and they have also served as 
the basis in many comparisons of welfare states (for an evaluation, see Kosonen 1992). My aim here is 
not to participate in this discussion, but rather to deal with economic and social polities of the Nordic 
countries, in particular Finland. The notion of the country-specific economic policy model shall be 
specified in this context. 
 
Country-specific economic policy models have been outlined in an internordic project on economic 
policies (see Mjøset 1987). The main focus was on the means used in the Nordic countries to control 
economic and social tensions and transformations. Economic policy models trace the complex interplay 
between economic structures, economic policy routines and political-institution al frameworks, in turn 
dependent on class structure and political mobilization. 
 
The postwar growth phase (`the golden age of capitalism') enabled policymakers to develop a series of 
successful economic and social policy routines. These routines, as well as class structures and political 
coalitions, differed from country to country, but a functioning model of economic and social policy was 
established in each of them. The international shocks of the 1970s and 1980s put a great strain on the 
Nordic models, but they persisted albeit with some modifications. 
 
To systematize the analysis of various economic and social policy models, a general framework is 
provided in Figure 1 (based on Kosonen 1987). 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 This description of the Finnish model and the Nordic model draws heavily on my collaboration with Jan Otto 
Andersson and Juhana Vartiainen, as a part of a Nordic research project on economic polities and integration. 
See Andersson. Kosonen & Vartiainen 1993. 
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Nordic models. In summarizing these characteristics, based on earlier Studies (see Mjøset 1987; 
Kosonen 1991), I will depict the main features of the Nordic model while noting that no single country 
fits it in every regard. 
 
(1) The Nordic countries have small open economies, and their dominating export sectors are based on 
raw materials. National productive systems are thus export oriented, they are based on a high level of 
national know-how, and they provide the foundation for a well organized body of capitalist interests. 
(2) The rate of labour force participation of working-age women is high. Thus, child care and services 
for the elderly must to a great extent be organized by the public sector. It must be noted, however, that 
women are mainly concentrated in a restricted number of Tower-paying, less prestigious occupations: 
there is persistent Sex segregation in the labour market. 
(3) Politics are characterized by strong social democratic and agrarian (center) parties. This reflects the 
high share of workers and farmers in the traditional class structure. Among the policy objectives, full 
employment and an equal distribution of incomes, as well as the welfare of farmers, are prominent. 
Since wage-earners, farmers and capital-owners are strongly organized on the national level, the stage is 
set for broad social agreements and income settlements. This system may be characterized as social 
corporatism. 
(4) The goal of economic policy is to maintain capital accumulation, full employment and an equal 
distribution of incomes simultaneously. Fiscal policies are moderately Keynesian, and, if need be, 
backed up by devaluations. There are important elements of selective supply side policies, for instance 
active labour market policies. Interest rates are kept low through credit rationing and high public saving. 
In social policy, the responsibility of the State is pronounced. Universal social security rights are in 
principle guaranteed to all citizens, and incomes are redistributed through transfers and taxation. The 
role of the public sector is fundamental both in social insurance and in service production. The main 
distinctive features of the Nordic welfare states may be termed universalism, redistribution and high 
taxation (for a West European comparison, see Kosonen 1993): 
 
- Universalism in social policy denotes that all citizens living in the country are covered by services and 
social transfers. Universalistic elements such as basic pensions are emphasized in social security ar-
rangements, but this does not exclude additional income-related systems. Moreover, a network of public 
services is available to every Citizen, and the share of public employment of total employment is high. 
 
- Through redistribution of incomes, the public sector affects the final income distribution among 
various income groups. As a result, income inequality and poverty rates tend to be relatively low. 
- In this kind of welfare system, taxation is usually high. The financing of social security is to a great 
extent based on general taxation (in particular personal income taxation) and employer contributions, in 
contrast to premiums payed by the insured themselves. 
 
The presentation of the Finnish model can be based on the previous characterization of the Nordic 
model. I try to trace “Nordic features” in the Finnish development as well as the distinctiveness of the 
Finnish model. 
 
In a Nordic comparison, the distinctiveness of the Finnish model can be seen in the Central status of 
export competitiveness and the peculiar constellation of interest mediation. These traits, in turn, are 
based on the industrial structure, in which agriculture and forest industry play crucial roles, and on the 
political system, in which agrarian and wage earners'  interests are mediated in a corporative and 
regulated way. The traditional Finnish model may be condensed in the following four points. 
 
(1) Due to late industrialization and the connections between forest owners and forest industry, the 
agricultural sector has remained large and powerful, and agrarian interests have been well served in all 
political settlements. Another important element is the effort to guarantee the competitiveness (profita-
bility) of the dominating export sector, i.e. the forest industry, often through devaluations. Since the 
world market demand for forest products is subject to powerful cyclical shocks, and Finnish economic 
policy tends to accentuate these disturbances, business fluctuations have been large. 
(2) Agrarian interests and the position of the Center Party have been more powerful in Finland than in 
the other Nordic countries. Workers have been well organized in labour unions and labour parties, but 
the fragmentation of the Finnish left has rendered it unable to generate a powerful hegemonic project 
comparable to that of the Swedish Social Democrats. The leading role of the Center Party in political 
coalitions (usually with the Social Democrats) explains, on the one hand, why the competitiveness of the 
export sector has been assigned a high priority in economic policy. This approach has become so dom-
inant that it is usually not challenged at all (see Kosonen 1989). On the other hand, the Finnish model 
has generated a comprehensive system of interest mediation, in which all important interest groups, as 
well as the state, are involved: interest mediation is vital for the political coalitions to maintain the 
support of decisive class groups. As a result, regulation and corporatism characterize Finnish political 
life. 
(3) In economic policy, the State has to guarantee the preconditions of capital accumulation and 
economic growth. However, the State must respect what are taken as `economic necessities' and 
safeguard the performance of the export sector in particular: in this sense the state (and the role of 
politics) is weaker than in Norway or Sweden. The principal aims of economic policy include economic 
growth, high investment and a competitive export sector. These priorities imply that it may be necessary 
to ignore such aims as full employment and the stability of economic development. When the 
profitability of the export sector weakens, policies react in a contractive fashion. Fiscal and monetary 
policy are tightened, the currency is devalued and wages are frozen. As a result, unemployment tends to 
increase. In good years, wages grow again and unemployment rates decline. 
(4) In social policy, Finland has adopted many Nordic characteristics, but social policy has been more 
subordinated to `economic necessities' than in other Nordic countries. During good times, however, 
social benefits are developed on the basis of corporatist interest mediation. Due to agrarian interests, 
universal social rights are developed according to the citizenship principle, but, due to the increasing 
strength of the trade unions and middle classes, parallel income-related systems have been created. 
Transfers and services are extended in such a way that all important interest groups (farmers, workers, 
Civil servants, middle classes, people living in towns and in the countryside) get their share. In particular 
such Nordic characteristics as universalism and redistribution are thus reinforced. In the following 
section, this development is outlined in more detail. 
 
3. THE MAKING OF THE FINNISH WELFARE STATE 
One of the Central axioms of the Finnish model has been that social policy must be subordinated to the 
“economic necessities” of the policy model. Thus, public expenditures are allowed to increase within the 
limits of economic growth, but this increase must not endanger the main political goal, i.e. the 
competitiveness of the export sector. As a result, the share of public expenditure of GDP has remained at 
a lower level than in the other Nordic countries, and reductions in social expenses are always required 
during economic recessions. 
 
This way of thinking was particularly strong immediately after the war and in the 1950s, when social 
reforms were introduced in many European countries. In Finland at the time, workers' accident insurance 
was almost the only legislative social insurance that fitted into the framework of the model. Child 
allowances were also introduced. A universal unemployment benefit was rejected on economic and 
moralistic grounds and the unemployed were instead assigned to badly paid public work projects (the so-
called spade line). The old-age insurance legislated in 1937 was not intended to become effective for 
a long time, and public sickness insurance plans were not adopted until the 1960s. (Alestalo & Uusitalo 
1986.) 
 
One peculiarity of the Finnish model was (and partly still is) that sociopolitical goals have been linked 
to agricultural policy. Thus, agricultural subsidies have played an important role in income 
redistribution and Social security. This policy, however, contributed to the delay of modern social 
legislation in Finland. 
 
The relative backwardness of the Finnish welfare state became clear in the early 1960s. The first wave 
of European integration, rapid industrialization and changing political constellations put Finland under 
pressure to introduce universal Social security systems. Thus, the breakthrough of the welfare state 
finally took place. Occupational pensions and sickness insurance were introduced in the early 1960s, 
active labour market policy was initiated in the late 1960s, and public health care was extended in the 
1970s. The share of Social expenditure in GDP increased, as can be seen from Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. The average share of social expenditure of the GPD according to country groups, 1960-86. 
 
In Figure 2, the Finnish and British share of social expenditure in GDP is compared to the average of 
three groups, i.e. Continental Europe, Peripheral Europe (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) and other 
Nordic countries. During the 1960s and 1970s, the share increased from a low level in Finland, but it 
increased even faster in other Nordic countries (in particular in Denmark and Sweden). In the mid-
1980s, Finland had attained the average West European level. 
 
Even the expansion of the welfare state is based on the working of the Finnish economic policy model. 
While the growth of the welfare state in the Nordic countries (notably in Sweden) has been strongly 
influenced by the ‘democratic class struggle’ under Social Democratic leadership (Korpi 1983), the 
Finnish development can be explained, on the one hand, by the position of the Center Party, and on the 
other hand by the system of corporatist interest mediation (see Alestalo, Flora & Uusitalo 1985). 
 
The Center Party has favoured universal flat-rate schemes which promote the interests of the agricultural 
population. The Social Democrats have also been able to promote the interests of their supporters, but 
this has happened through the system of corporatist concertation, in which employers' interest 
organizations have also played an important role. Thus, universal social security arrangements in 
Finland are interwoven with arrangements based on one's labour market position. 
 
The Finnish welfare state model may be illustrated by the implementation of legislated occupational 
pensions (see Kangas & Palme 1989). In Sweden, the Social Democratic strategy was aimed 
at a public solution and a fully legislated scheme with pension funds under state control. In Finland this 
reform was negotiated by the labour market partners, and the employers were willing to accept a 
decentralized scheme with funds in private insurance companies in charge of the pension funds. The 
occupational pension system was thus connected to the financing of capital accumulation. 
 
These divergent features notwithstanding, the Finnish welfare state developed in a “Nordic” (or 
Scandinavian) direction in the 1970s and 1980s. The share of social expenditure in GDP increased from 
7 per cent in 1960 to 22-23 per cent in the mid-1980s, i.e. to an average Western European level. In 
addition, the Finnish welfare state took on “Nordic” characteristics such as universalism and 
redistribution, in contrast to the more status-preserving Continental welfare states (see Kosonen 1993). 
This can be seen from the share of public employment and the financing of social security. 
 
In the universal welfare system of the Nordic countries, all citizens are covered by basic services and 
social transfers, whereas within the Continental European systems, benefits are more tied to one's 
position in the labour market and one's family status, which means that the Continental systems tend to 
be status-preserving. Universal welfare states also provide a safety net of public services, and therefore 
the share of public employment in relation to total employment has increased in the Nordic states. In 
Finland, this increase has been more rapid than in Continental Europe but somewhat slower than in the 
other Nordic countries (see Figure 3). Employment in public health Gare, day care and education 
expanded in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
 
Figure 3. The average proportion of public employment in relation to total employment according to 
country groups, 1960 and 1966-88. 
 
The Finnish welfare state has also been quite redistributive. A recent comparative cross-national study 
indicates that the distribution of disposable income around 1980 was more equal in Sweden, Norway and 
Finland than in Britain, Germany and Switzerland (Gustafsson & Uusitalo 1990). This relatively even 
distribution of income in the Nordic welfare states can be explained mainly by the redistributive impact 
of the public sector. Universal citizenship pensions (‘national pensions’) play an important role in this 
respect. Poverty problems were not eradicated, but poverty rates decreased substantially in these 
countries from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. In this development, Finland followed the Swedish and 
Norwegian line. 
 
According to a report based on Nordic surveys from 1986-88, the distribution of the material standard 
has hecome more equal in the Nordic countries. The differences in standard between manual workers 
and salaried employees has decreased in all countries but more so in Norway than in Finland. This trend 
coincides with a general increase in standard of living in these countries. (Vogel 1991.) 
 
In Table 1, compensation levels of various income transfers in the Nordic countries are compared. For 
the calculation of the compensation level, typical cases of single male industrial workers have been 
utilized. In 1990, compensation levels were lower in Finland than in Sweden and Norway, but pensions 
and illness benefits were somewhat better in Finland than in Denmark. All in all, Finland had nearly 
reached the Nordic level during the 1980s. 
 
TABLE 1. COMPENSATION LEVELS OF VARIOUS INCOME TRANSFERS AS A PER CENT OF THE 
FORMER AVERAGE INCOME OF A SINGLE MALE INDUSTRIAL WORKER IN 1990 IN FOUR 
NORDIC COUNTRIES.* 
 Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
Old age pension incl. of 
supplementary pension 
56 58 70 70 
Invalidity / anticipatory pension 82 70 71 70 
Illness benefits 75 82 100 91 
Unemployment benefits 75 64 68 85 
*Compensation level after taxation.  
Source: Social Security in the Nordic Countries 1993, 38, 39, 41. 
 
In the financing of social security, Finland followed Nordic patterns during the 1970s. Social security 
was financed predominantly by taxes and other revenues collected by the public sector, and employee 
contributions remained small. This contrasts with Continental and Southern Europe, where social 
security is financed mainly by employer or employee contributions, since social security is based on 
individual and collective arrangements. 
 
However, the share of employer contributions became higher in Finland and Sweden than in Denmark 
and Nor way. Denmark is an example of a country where social security is financed almost completely 
by taxes. In Finland, the financial burden is divided between tax financing and employer contributions. 
 
In the overall level of taxation, Finland departs from the Nordic model. Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
may be characterized as `tax states' where about half of GDP in collected in taxes and other 
contributions. Not so in Finland. As can be seen from Figure 4, the share of total taxation has remained 
substantially lower in Finland than in other Nordic countries and in Continental Europe. Were 
contributions for legislated occupational pensions (administered by private insurance companies) 
included, the share would increase somewhat, but basic differences would remain. 
 
 
Figure 4. The average share of total taxation of the GPD according to country groups,  
1960 and 1965-88. 
 
With regard to labour market policy, the Swedish model has emphasized active methods to combat 
unemployment, whereas in Finland unemployment rates have varied according to macroeconomic 
variation. However, active employment policies were also introduced in Finland during the good times 
of the 1980s. In particular, the Employment Act of 1987 provided long-term unemployed persons with 
jobs for six months. 
 
As a result, long-term unemployment was radically reduced and total unemployment decreased slightly 
(to 3-4 per cent in the late 1980s). 
 
Thus, in the 1980s there seemed to be a converging trend in the Nordic welfare state development as 
Finland, the late-comer, adopted many - even if not all - characteristics of the Nordic welfare model. 
 
4.THE WELFARE STATE AS THE CAUSE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CRISIS? 
 
In the early 1990s, the beneficial socioeconomic development in Finland has turned into economic 
decline and emergency measures. Economic difficulties prevail also in other Nordic countries. In this 
situation, welfare state development has been denounced as the source of economic and social crises. In 
particular in Finland, it is argued that the welfare state became too generous compared to economic 
resources, and cuts are proposed as a cure. 
 
The crucial question is: can these economic and social difficulties be traced back to the expansion of the 
Nordic welfare states? In this case, one should find inherent contradictions emerging already before the 
beginning of the recession, i.e. in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
In a recent comparative study, Ramesh Mishra (1990) outlined policies of retrenchment and maintenance 
of the welfare state in the 1980s in Western Europe, North America and Australia. According to his 
comparisons, the strategy and policy of retrenchment was not strongest in countries with highly 
developed welfare systems, but rather in countries with small or medium-sized welfare states. Of all 
countries studied, Sweden was alone in its willingness and ability to defend both the commitment to full 
employment and to a high level of social welfare. Sweden had weathered the storm in the 1970s and 
1980s without sacrificing economics effectiveness and social justice. 
 
There were to some extent divergent reactions in the Nordic countries. According to Marklund's 
comparison of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, it was 
Denmark where cuts and alterations had taken place, and these had followed a general pattern towards 
increased selectivity of welfare measures. Finland and Norway had some welfare state retrenchment in 
the late 1970s, but in the 1980s they experienced rather an expansion. Together with Sweden, they 
exemplified welfare state stability (Marklund 1988; see also Kosonen 1991). 
 
Thus, with the exception of Denmark, contradictions between welfare policies and economic-social 
development were not very pronounced in the Nordic countries in the 1970s and 1980s. This can be 
understood if one examines the dynamics of the economic-political models, based on Figure 1 above. 
 
First, economic and social policy has an influence on the relative position and income distribution of 
various class groups (E). Two Nordic peculiarities may be identified: universal entitlements and income 
redistribution. Universal entitlements, which are available to all persons living in the country, have ben-
efited all groups and thus helped to maintain support for the welfare state. The case of income 
redistribution is somewhat more complicated. Redistribution may enhance the solidarity and 
cohesiveness of the population, but it may also cause criticism among the well-to-do. Much depends on 
the way in which social transfers and services are financed; reliance on income taxes can he named as 
one of the causes of welfare backlash in Denmark. 
 
One of the most important results of economic and social policy, from the viewpoint of political 
reactions, is the level of unemployment. With an effective economic policy with respect to the labour 
market, in particular Norway and Sweden were able to prevent the increase of unemployment rates in 
the 1970s and 1980s. On the other hand, the specific problems of the Danish welfare state seem to be 
associated with its high unemployment rates since the mid-1970s. Unemployment is likely to produce 
social dualism and worsen the financial and political problems of the welfare state. 
 
It is thus possible to conclude that the favourable results of economic and social policies enhanced 
political support for the welfare state in Norway and Sweden. Despite criticism, people in Denmark also 
want to maintain the main pillars of the welfare state. 
 
Similarly, support for social reforms remained stable in Finland during the 1980s. The majority of the 
population thought that the speed of social reforms was proper or even too slow from 1980 to 1990; only 
after the outbreak of the crisis did critical opinion strengthen somewhat (Allardt, Sihvo & Uusitalo 
1992). In spite of the enactment of a tax ceiling in the late 1970s in response to the `revolt of the 
affluent' and a reduction of marginal income taxes in the late 1980s, the financial and political basis of 
the welfare state has not fundamentally altered. 
 
Secondly, economic and social policies have had an impact on the economic performance of the Nordic 
countries (D), particularly on the financing of social security and on the competitiveness of the export 
sector. 
 
The financial burden of the welfare state depends on the share of social expenditure in GDP. Figure 2 
above shows that from 1960 to 1986 Finland attained the average West European level but remained 
below the level of other Nordic countries. Changes of social security expenditure as per cent of GDP 
from 1978 to 1990, based on Nordic social statistics, are presented in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2. SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE AS PER CENT OF GPD  
IN FOUR NORDIC COUNTRIES, 1978-1990. 
 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 
Sweden 31.7 34.2 32.7 35.2 34.8 
Denmark 26.4 30.3 28.7 27.7 29.7 
Norway 22.1 21.8 22.6 26.4 29.0 
Finland 21.5 21.0 23.3 25.4 25.7 
SOURCE: SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE NORDIC  COUNTRIES 1993, 179. 
 
From 1987 to 1990, the share of Social expenditure in GDP remained at a high level in Sweden, also by 
international standards. In Denmark and Norway, the share rose quite rapidly. By contrast, in Finland 
the share remained practically at its previous level, since the expansion of social expenditure concided 
with rapid economic growth. Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s the financial burden of the welfare 
State was smallest in Finland, and it did not exceed the Western European average. It is therefore 
difficult to confirm the claim that rising social expenditure was one of the primary causes of the current 
Finnish economic crisis since 1990. From 1991 onwards, the share of social expenditure in GDP has 
reached a level well over 30 percent, but this is mainly an effect of recession and not one of its causes. 
 
Has the competitiveness of the Nordic export sectors been impaired by welfare State development? It is 
a popular assumption that welfare states are in contradiction with competitiveness (see Pfaller et al. 
1991). First, price competitiveness is reduced due to the high Social costs which must be borne by 
enterprises. In addition, it is fashionable to claim that the welfare State has become an even greater an 
obstacle to innovation and higher productivity, factors which are important in modern production and 
marketing. 
 
However, increasing welfare costs did not prevent economic development in the Nordic countries. When 
measured by growth, employment and income distribution, economic performance of the Nordic 
countries during the 1970s and 1980s was quite satisfactory (Pekkarinen, Pohjola & Rowthorn 1992). 
Industrial growth was not very rapid, but the overall picture was brighter than in many other European 
countries. One possible interpretation is that contrary to fashionable arguments, productivity and 
innovation benefit from the welfare State, or at least from some parts of it. High-productivity and high 
quality production requires systems of training and education, and co-operation between business and 
labour may be beneficial as well (Pfaller et al. 1991). Thus, economic performance is not necessarily in 
contradiction with the welfare State. A welfare system may or may not enhance economic and Social 
development in a country, depending on the distribution of spending and on the relationship of Social 
policy to economic productivity and innovation. 
 
It is true that structural economic problems appeared in many Nordic countries in the 1970s and 1980s, 
including the limited size of the Danish export industry, the one-sidedness of the Finnish export sector, 
and the dominance of oil production in relation to mainland industrial production in Norway. These 
structural problems Gould be examined in a separate study. However, with the possible exception of 
Denmark, these problems seem not to he caused by Social policies or by the level of Social expenditure. 
 
The structural problems of the Finnish economy, in particular, can hardly be explained by welfare state 
development. Rather, the one-sidedness and the low processing level of exports have been constant 
features of the Finnish economic structure, and they have been preserved through devaluations and in-
terest rate policies. Due to long-standing policy decisions, particularly with regard to subsidies, 
agriculture has suffered from insufficient structural adaptation. It must be noticed, however, that 
specialization in engineering and related products increased rapidly from the early 1960s to the end of 
the 1980s, i.e. during the period of welfare State expansion. Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s the Finnish 
business sector experienced a stronger productivity performance than its Nordic neighbours (Moe 1991, 
109). 
 
5. TENSIONS AND CHANGES IN THE FINNISH MODEL AFTER THE MlD-1980s 
 
As emphasized above, the Finnish model as such is crisis-prone. In the postwar period, phases of 
economic growth and recession have alternated. Since the world market demand for Finnish export 
products (forest products) is subject to powerful cyclical shocks, and the procyclical tendencies of 
Finnish monetary and fiscal policies have accentuated these disturbances, business fluctuations have 
been large. These characteristics of the Finnish model may, in turn, be traced back to the industrial 
and political structure and to the lack of distinctive political strategies. 
 
Thus, the recession and the economic-political reactions of the early 1990s are nothing entirely new in 
Fin land. What is new, however, is that the international preconditions of the Finnish model have changed 
considerably. This change is caused by globalization, Europeanization - and by the collapse of the 
Soviet economy. 
 
The collapse of the Soviet economy is of Special concern to Finland, since trade with the Soviet Union 
was substantial (nearly one fifth of total trade) and beneficial for Finland. This trade fell rapidly at the 
beginning of the 1990s, and its share has collapsed to 2-3 per cent of total exports. The decline of export 
income is, in turn, one factor behind the current crisis. 
 
At the same time, changes are occurring in the capitalist world economy that are related to the process 
of globalization. In a globalized international economy, individual national economies are subsumed and 
rearticulated into the system by essentially international processes and transactions. The international 
system becomes autonomized as markets and production become truly global. (Hirst & Thompson 
1992.) This kind of globalized economy does not yet exist, however many of its features have become 
more pronounced. The shift from standardized mass production to more flexible systems has intensified 
the international division of labour, which often is organized within a corporation. 
 
Moreover, monetary and currency markets are being influenced more and more by international capital 
movements. There are several reasons for there processes: imbalances between rich and poor countries, 
loose money floating from a country to another, and general trends towards deregulation of monetary 
markets. 
 
Changes in financial markets are of particular concern to all Nordic countries. They all made decisions 
to deregulate their capital markets in the 1980s, thus relinquishing a large part of their economic-political 
sovereignty. Denmark was in the lead in the deregulation process: in 1982-83 it embarked on a hard 
currency option, and deregulation was completed already in 1987. Norway came next in 1984 with the 
lifting of direct regulations on banks and insurance Company lending. In Norway, as well as in Sweden, 
deregulation was practically completed in 1990. 
 
Although Finland followed this Nordic line in the 1980s, some Finnish peculiarities may be noticed. In 
1986 a gradual deregulation of financial markets occurred, and the first steps were taken to terminate the 
regulation of interests rates when the Bank of Finland stopped controlling interest rates. One year later 
enterprises were given free access to international long-term loans. By 1991, all restrictions on 
international capital movements had been lifted. It is interesting to note that all decisions were made by 
civil servants of the Bank of Finland. Deregulation never became part of the political agenda overtly 
discussed by the political parties and the government; nor were the political parties especially interested 
in it. Moreover, commercial banks acquired extensive options to take and transmit foreign loans, but no 
corresponding public control measures were enacted. 
 
What are the effects of this kind of deregulation? The answer may be based on the so-called 
“impossibility theorem” (Grahl & Teague 1990). According to this theorem, fixed exchange rates, in-
dependent monetary policies, and full mobility of capital are incompatible because fully mobile capital 
will always flow from a country with lower interest rates to one with higher rates - unless there is a risk 
of exchange rate movements. This makes independent monetary policies or fixed exchange rates 
impossible. Thus, independent monetary policies of the postwar period were based on restrictions of 
capital movements. Now, with the present liberalization of private capital movements, it can be expected 
that either interest rates or exchange rates will become more unstable, as in fact is happening in many 
West European countries today. 
 
Finnish events confirm the impossibility theorem. During the latter part of the 1980s, free capital 
movements led to an overheating of the financial sector and to competition between the banks. The 
deregulation of credit unleashed the repressed demand for loans, and a buoyant loan expansion concided 
with an overall boom in the economy. The banks, free from the tutelage of the Bank of Finland and 
unaccustomed to operating in a market-oriented environment, increased their loans in a rather Cavalier 
way and thus generated a boom of speculation and investment of dubious long-term quality. As there 
were generous rules for tax-deductions, housing investments expanded as did the prices of apartments. A 
consumption and investment boom followed. When the economic recession began in 1989-90, interest 
rates went up, resulting in reduced domestic demand and investments; foreign debt expanded, and the 
policy of fixed exchange rates and hard currency failed completely. As a result, GDP collapsed by 10 
per cent in two years and unemployment soared from 3 per cent in 1990 to 15 per cent by the end of 
1992. 
 
The success story of financial liberalization was replaced by banking crisis and bank support. The first 
measure was the takeover by the Bank of Finland of Skopbank in 1991 following an acute liquidity 
crisis. In 1992, the government decided to provide the banks with a capital injection totalling 8 billion 
markka in order to ensure the continued supply of bank credit to customers. The third measure was the 
creation of the Government Guarantee Fund, which seems to need tens of billions of markka. (Nyberg 
1992.) 
 
Thus, the Finnish version of the impossibility theorem was that deregulation of capital movements made 
both fixed exchange rates and independent monetary policies impossible. Moreover, it made bank 
support necessary. In sum, a radical change in the preconditions of the Finnish and other Nordic welfare 
models has occurred. In a globalized economy, national economic-political autonomy is challenged to a 
great extent. This implies, first, that the room for maneuvering in national employment policies is 
restricted, and high unemployment figures will persist for a long time to come. Second, because of 
budget deficits and problems in the banking sector, it is difficult to maintain current levels of social 
security and public services. 
 
6. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY DURING RECESSION 
 
A crucial element of the Finnish economic policy model has been to preserve international 
competitiveness. When competitiveness of the export sector weakens, policies react in a contractive 
fashion. This response can he very clearly seen during the recession in the early 1990s. Despite the 
grave consequences for domestic demand, the government has made a very serious attempt to cut wages 
and social expenditure. Competitiveness has been enhanced through devaluations and bank support. On 
the other hand, no effective measures to combat mass unemployment have been utilized. 
 
These traditional economic policies, however, are carried out in the new environment described above. 
Free international capital movements and the deep crisis of the financial sector are reinforcing the 
contractive effects of domestic policies. As a result, economic decline is deeper and the rise of 
unemployment is faster than during previous recessions. 
 
Finnish currency policy provides a good example of the old and new traits in recent economic policy 
decisions. When the steady markka policy proved unsustainable in face of speculative attacks, the 
markka was devalued by 14 percent in November 1991. Even that parity was abandoned and the markka 
was floated in September 1992. Excellent price competitiveness, which is a result of devaluations, has 
made it possible to increase exports. However, export companies are using their earnings to pay back 
their foreign debts. The contraction of domestic demand and the weakening of the markka are hurting 
the home-market companies. Export growth is thus not able to being unemployment down from its 
current high levels. The growth in unemployment and tax increases are further restraining consumption, 
and the recession is being prolonged. 
 
Interest rates remained high until December 1992 despite the fact that the markka had depreciated by 
about 25 percent with respect to the Deutschmark. This worsened the situation of indebted enterprises 
and households. In 1993, interest rates have fallen close to European averages. 
 
Thus, the volume of total output contracted by 10 percent from 1990 to 1992. As a consequence, 
unemployment increased rapidly. In 1993, the unemployment rate is estimated to have risen to 17 or 
even to 20 percent. According to the Ministry of Labour statistics this corresponds to 500 000 unem-
ployed. 
 
According to the government, the Employment Act, which was meant to combat long-term 
unemployment, costs too much. An active labour market policy cannot be maintained, and longterm 
unemployment has been increasing rapidly. 
 
In this situation, social security arrangements were needed more than ever. However, the government is 
convinced that public expenditure must be reduced and that the welfare state must be cut back. At a time 
when tax receipts are decreasing and expenditures for unemployment and bank support are increasing, 
central government finances remain in substantial deficit. To solve these problems, the government has 
proposed cuts in unemployment benefits, child allowances and other benefits. In addition, many services 
are to be privatized. All in all, limitation of the public sector has become one of the central economic 
policy objectives. The amounts of benefits must be cut back and/or the number of these entitled to 
receive services and transfers must be decreased; the production of services must be rendered 
increasingly effective; and price mechanisms must be introduced to affect the supply of and the demand 
for services (The Finnish Economy to 1996). 
 
In 1991-92 cutbacks and saving plans do not seem to have reduced social transfers or services 
substantially (see Heikkilä & Lehto 1992). However, the Finnish municipalities will face a financial 
crisis in the future, since their incomes are decreasing at a time when more and more people will need 
social support. 
 
As a consequence, the welfare state model towards which Finland moved in the 1970s and 1980s is 
under pressure. The compensation levels of pensions, unemployment benefits and illness benefits will be 
reduced. Public services such as health care and day care will be curtailed. Income inequalities are very 
likely to widen again. Despite cutbacks and reductions, however, the share of social expenditure in GDP 
will remain high, since there will be more and more people who need employment benefits, social 
assistance and social services. 
 
What is the theoretical or ideological rationale behind this turn? One could assume that these economic 
and social policy measures are based on neo-liberal thinking and research. This, however, is not the 
case. The justification of these measures may simply be denoted Finnish pragmatism: decisions must be 
made because of prevailing `economic necessities.' Libertarian, neo-liberal or some other theoretical 
foundations are not needed: common sense is enough. 
 
7. THE FINNISH WELFARE STATE FACING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
The current changes form a major turning point in the development of the Finnish and other Nordic 
welfare models. In the process of globalization and deregulation of capital movements, the stability of 
these models is lost, and the room for maneuvering in national economic and social policies has been 
considerably diminished. As a result, the national welfare models of the Nordic type are being seriously 
challenged. 
 
From a Finnish point of view, the present situation is nothing entirely new. According to the traditional 
Finnish model, the State must respect “economic necessities” and in particular the success of the export 
sector. Social policy is subordinated to these “economic necessities”, and reductions in social expenses 
are often required during economic recessions. However, in the new international environment the 
results of this economic policy model are more drastic than during previous recessions. 
 
In this situation, Finland - together with Austria, Norway and Sweden - have applied for EC membership. 
These countries have been participating in European integration since the early 1960s when West 
European countries outside the EC formed EFTA. Moreover, EFTA countries signed free trade 
agreements with the EC in the early 1970s. In the 1990s, however, the EC is entering into a new phase 
with its internal market programme and plans for economic and monetary union. It may be asked how 
EC integration will change the Finnish model and other Nordic models. 
 
Firstly, EC membership will have various economic consequences for Finland (Hjerppe 1992). It is often 
hoped that EC membership will create a more favourable investment environment both for domestic and 
foreign investors, as well as a higher efficiency due to greater competition. On the other hand, economic 
adjustment problems will appear, particularly in agriculture and in remote parts of the country. Since the 
Finnish economy has become vulnerable in the 1990s, it is possible that these adjustment problems will 
become more difficult and will concern more areas of the economy than could be predicted only a few 
years ago. 
 
Secondly, the role of autonomous national economic policy will be further diminished. As was 
mentioned above, this autonomy has already been reduced due to globalization and the liberalization of 
capital movements. Member states of the EC and in particular of the economic and monetary union 
(EMU) will transfer a great deal of their economic decision-making into EC institutions. On the benefit 
side one can note the gains derived from lower inflation, stable exchange rates and a smaller interest rate 
differential vis-à-vis other European countries (Hjerppe 1992). On the cost side, however, one can notice 
fewer prospects for combating unemployment and stabilizing the economy through national measures. 
The scope for such measures would be small already during the transition period: EMU criteria would 
require a tight fiscal policy since government debt (which has rapidly increased in Finland) must be 
diminished. 
 
Thirdly, the Nordic welfare systems will be affected by EC membership. This will not be a result of EC 
social legislation, which is a minor area in EC integration. For instance, the Danish welfare state has 
preserved many of its `Nordic' characteristics as far. However, in the 1990s EC membership implies 
pressures on financing in the Nordic welfare states. It is likely that, in particular, high tax countries like 
Denmark and Sweden will be affected by the proposed tax harmonization. The greater the share of 
taxation on goods and services, and the higher the existing levels of taxation, the more adjustments may 
be expected (Petersen 1991). In the early 1990s, the share of public expenditure in GDP has exceeded 50 
percent in Finland as well, due to the contraction of GDP. All in all, tax harmonization will mean a 
substantial loss of public revenues in the Nordic countries, and a good deal of innovative thinking will 
be needed to find ways to compensate for their loss if the Nordic welfare model is to be maintained. 
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